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Summary
Based on public demands for rectifying injuries of the past, memory politics 
recently became the most potent catalyst of social divisions and confronta-
tions, as well as possible limitation of freedom of expression. In addition, 
facing the past might not yield conciliatory, but rather antagonizing effects, 
leading toward so-called “memory wars” regarding conflicting past narra-
tives that might jeopardize political stability and aggravate cultural trauma in 
highly polarized societies, especially if there are powerful mnemonic warri-
ors propelled with foundational and teleological attempts to impose historical 
“truth”, as the author shows in the first part of the article. In the second part 
the author focuses on the origin of the politics of memory in Croatia and on-
going “memory wars” regarding displaying and using controversial symbolic 
expressions, while parts three and four contain a critical analysis of the Dia-
logue Document provided by the Council for Dealing with the Consequences 
of Undemocratic Regimes that aimed to deliver comprehensive recommenda-
tions for political decision-making and law-framing in an attempt to face the 
difficult past and socially contested symbolic expressions.
Keywords: Memory Politics, Memory Wars, Mnemonic Warriors, Disputed 
Symbols, Croatia, Dialogue Document
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
William Faulkner
Introduction
In 1657 François Peleau sent the letter to Thomas Hobbes in which he wrote: “I 
found that, in my opinion, there is now and has always been a war of minds, so far 
as opinions and feelings are concerned, and that this war is exactly like the state of 
nature” (Malcolm, 1994: 424). Indeed, it is not hard to make a parallel with today’s 
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“memory wars”1 over the interpretation of controversial memories and historical 
events. As Peleau suggested, “war” should not necessarily be seen as a concept in-
volving physical destruction, but rather, in the case of “memory wars”, an ongoing 
conflict over the meaning, involving contestations about opposing views of history 
and symbols that deeply polarize and potentially destabilize society. These memory 
wars have been raging worldwide propelled by various mnemonic actors that use 
symbols as their weapons in order to unveil hidden injustices or cultural trauma, to 
commemorate the fallen soldiers or victims of past regimes, or to glorify/condemn 
certain historical events that were neglected in previous political constellations. The 
background for the rise of recent memory wars is, depending on the context, dif-
ferent, yet the whole condition can be viewed in a broader sense as a reaction to 
various political and social changes – from the postcolonial/post-communist dis-
courses of national liberation, the rise of the culture of victimhood and the human 
rights culture, to the fall of the Enlightenment project2 followed by the postmodern/
post-liberal condition and its narrative of the fall of “grand narratives”3 that, as a 
consequence, affected the rise of particular national memories. Of course, many are 
affected. Croatia, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Ar-
gentina, the United States, just to mention a few. 
In this article my aim is to show how historical memory and mnemonic actors 
play a fundamental role in shaping political life in general and in Croatia in par-
ticular. For that purpose I have divided the article into four sections. Since memory 
politics is a reflection of various socio-political activities that can be attributed to 
mnemonic actors, I will start by providing an account of their foundationalist as 
1 “Memory wars” can be linked to the proliferation of political violence based on conflicting and 
mutually opposed interpretations of historical memories resulting from past traumas, or demands 
for official endorsement of particular memory-related views. The term has been used, for exam-
ple, by Gareth Stockey (2013) as a description of ongoing public controversies in contemporary 
Spain regarding the monument Valley of the Fallen that Francisco Franco erected during his rule 
to serve as a model for national reconciliation, but more importantly as a glorification of his own 
regime. The Spanish memory wars are an outcome of the controversy regarding the fallen fas-
cists and their victims from the Spanish Civil War, all buried at this monumental place. Recently, 
this controversy erupted as a result of Spain’s efforts to clarify the status of the monument and of 
the buried fascist leaders including Franco himself. For example, in Australia similar struggles 
have been known as the “history wars” regarding the “memorial discourses around genocide in 
Tasmania” (Gigliotti, 2017: 23). 
2 “The Enlightenment project” is a term coined by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue 
(1981) but originated from the criticism of the Enlightenment articulated especially in the mid-
twentieth century by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1944) and other writings. 
3 In his seminal work La condition postmoderne (1979), Jean-François Lyotard introduced the 
rise of “small narratives” instead of so-called “grand narratives” – those dictating the truth for all.
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well as teleological strategies in shaping public discourse on historical memories. 
These strategies should be viewed central in the politicization of trauma that is im-
portant for propelling so-called memory wars for the purposes of establishing a he-
gemonic view on national memories. This section can be viewed as an introduction 
into the second part of the article that will focus on the Croatian politics of memory 
by discussing the origins of memory disputes and recent controversies regarding 
the display of symbols and symbolic expressions. These origins might be found in 
various narratives about Croatian history, for example, about Croatia as the Ante-
murale Christianitatis (Bulwark of Christendom) that was used to legitimize Cro-
atian independence in the 1990s; or more recent disputes regarding the qualification 
of the Homeland War as defensive, not aggressive that resulted in the Parliament’s 
Declaration on the Homeland War (2000); or dealing with the memories and lega-
cies of undemocratic regimes and their symbols in the Dialogue Document (2018) 
that attempts to serve as a detailed memory law proposal, and as such it will be the 
focus of my article in sections three and four. In section three I will thoroughly ana-
lyze the narrative of the Dialogue Document provided by the Croatian Council for 
Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, while section four will 
be devoted to the Council’s dealings with particular disputed symbolic expressions 
and its recommendations for their legal regulations. Since the Dialogue Document 
is the first document in Croatia aiming toward providing comprehensive recom-
mendations for political decision-making and law-framing regarding controversial 
past regimes and symbols, I will discuss its theoretical shortcomings and internal 
inconsistencies that have to be taken into account when dealing with the problem 
of symbolic expressions and memory politics in Croatia. In analyzing this particu-
lar case I will provide some relevant case-law examples from the European juris-
prudence, more particularly from Hungary, due to the fact that some of these cases 
have become paradigmatic in discussing contentious symbolic expressions, as well 
as for the reason Hungary has similar cultural traumas related to fascist and com-
munist terror. The article ends with an epilogue about the detrimental social effects 
of Croatian memory wars and attempts toward continuous silencing of the past.
I. Two Faces of Mnemonic Warriors
Political transformations are seen as an opportunity for new political actors to shape 
the national mnemonic landscape, especially for those “mnemonic warriors”4, 
4 Bernhard and Kubik focus “on the explosion of the politics of memory triggered by the twen-
tieth anniversary of the fall of state socialism” (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014: 2). They developed 
the concept of “mnemonic warriors” as one out of four kinds of mnemonic political actors un-
derstood as “individuals, parties, organizations, etc.” (ibid.: 11). For them these mnemonic war-
riors can be defined as the mnemonic actors that push for only one version of truth in their nar-
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mythmakers, who, on their mnemonic crusade, zealously impose a single, “truth-
ful” or correct version of history while delegitimizing all views and actors unable 
to fit under the same mnemonic umbrella. Their take on memories envelops the na-
tional past either as nostalgia or trauma. Both need to be alleviated via various com-
memorative, sacrificial, or glorious recollections often filled with the plethora of 
martyrs and heroes, all wrapped up in one shared memory5 that matters not merely 
as a reproduction of recollected historic events, but rather as a source for the politi-
cization of memory where “the past is remade in the present for present purposes” 
(Olick, 1999: 341). This view is important when analyzing so-called mnemonic 
warriors and their role in influencing politics of memory, especially in highly di-
vided societies dealing with past cultural traumas. In order to understand how such 
mnemonic cleavages have been fuelled in these societies, I decide to take Bernhard 
and Kubik’s analysis one step further and to argue that mnemonic warriors should 
be viewed as those propelled with certain important theoretical underpinnings – 
foundational and teleological – that might nurture political instability on the one 
hand, as well as aggravate cultural trauma on the other.
First, since mnemonic warriors have the perception that they are on the “mis-
sion” to deliver or reveal historical truth upon which political entity is founded, 
they can be regarded as political foundationalists who believe that political entity 
must necessarily be, or it already is, grounded upon exceptional – and hence foun-
dational – “truthful” historic stories and events – like those about powerful ru-
lers, law-givers, or victorious/traumatic events. They are not necessarily national 
“Founding Fathers”, but might consider themselves as an extension of the found-
ing process by recollecting and defining decisive events constitutive for national 
state-building. At the same time, that foundational understanding of history is often 
ratives related to the national past memories and commemorative politics, and due to their rejec-
tion of other possible views on these controversial issues, their non-negotiable mnemonic narra-
tives yield mnemonic cleavages and fractured regimes. Along with the “warriors” they recognize 
“pluralists” (obviously advocating a pluralist view on national memory), “abnegators” (those not 
actively interested in the mnemonic narratives), and “prospectives” (oriented toward the future, 
usually viewed in revolutionary terms, hence not relevant for transitional post-communist socie-
ties). The dominance of one mnemonic actor over the other determines “the political form of the 
official memory regime” (ibid.: 19).
5 Avishai Margalit makes an important distinction between a common memory and a shared 
memory. A common memory is just an aggregate notion of “the memories of all those people 
who remember a certain episode which each of them experienced individually”, while a shared 
memory “requires communication... integrates and calibrates the different perspectives... into 
one version... Shared memory is torn between two worldviews, which are manifested, in their 
pure forms, by science on the one hand and by myth on the other” (Margalit, 2002: 51-52, 64). In 
that sense, the notion of a shared memory plays an important role in the political foundationalism 
as well as in the process of mythification of national history.
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revealed urbi et orbi through the lenses of the actor’s personal story – of personal 
struggles and reflections – in a way to show the public that there is “a link between 
history and his personal story, between history and autobiography... in which his 
self and the history of humanity meet, like two powerful currents, until they reach 
the point where all masks fall and a mysterious unity is revealed” (Alejandro, 2011: 
27).6 A mythologized view on history, that Bernal in her seminal work on the con-
cept of founding calls the authoritative beginning, “generates this political founda-
tionalism by eliciting retrospective agreement and establishing grounds for politics 
and laws” based on self-evident truths and agreements (Bernal, 2017: 4) assum-
ing that history itself is transparent and beyond contestations. In other words, this 
“originalist account of founding”, as called by Bernal, “authorizes without itself 
needing authorization, since its authority is beyond question”, and as she correctly 
continues, it “renders founding not simply outside history, but also outside legiti-
mation. In that respect, the questions we might ask of the past become muted: ques-
tions about past inequalities, democratic deficits, persistent foundational disagree-
ments and conflicts, and, most importantly, past violence and injustices” (ibid.: 38). 
To conclude, since mnemonic contestations might jeopardize political stability in 
highly polarized societies the problem with mnemonic warriors is in their “found-
ing” mission – in establishing hegemonic truth, and excluding/delegitimizing their 
opponents. Such political foundationalism is not attuned to the democratic and plu-
ralist ideal of constitutional democracies, but if successful it might influence shap-
ing memory laws as “the legal governance of history” (Belavusau and Gliszczyń-
ska-Grabias, 2017: 1).
Second, mnemonic warriors can be considered as political teleologists – their 
locus is not the past alone, but the present or/and future. In other words, while foun-
dational memories are critical for constituting “thick relations” (Margalit, 2002: 7), 
a popular consensus, or the people having the beginning, origins, state-building, 
identity, or other similar concepts in a narrative of political liberation and/or rise 
of a nation, these foundational building-blocks of shared memory lack another key 
element – a collective telos, a common fate, a point and purpose, along with a mne-
monic actor who now, as a political teleologist, emerges as someone able “to ex-
press the character of collective life as a project” (Koskenniemi, 2011: 25), as some-
one capable to fill a void in the present and alleviate uncertainty of the future for 
the average memory-consumer. For such a mnemonic warrior it is crucial to master 
public frustrations and traumas associated with memories – similarly to the Nie-
tzschean ascetic priest who deals with ressentiment of the masses, and who predates 
6 Actually, this is Alejandro’s description of Nietzsche, of what he calls Nietzsche’s historio-
biography according to which the past resonates in the present through the author himself (Ale-
jandro, 2011).
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over those who “suffer” – those looking for justice, revenge, dignity, or some sense 
of meaning, no matter how obscure that road might look like. For Nietzsche, the one 
who rules over the suffering is a master of deceit, yet with a perverse sense of mas-
tering over those defined by suffering – “whilst he soothes the pain caused by the 
wound, he poisons the wound at the same time” (Nietzsche, 1994: 98) – basically 
encouraging them to “rummage through the bowels of their past and present for ob-
scure, questionable stories”, to “rip open the oldest wounds and make themselves 
bleed to death from scars long-since healed...” (ibid.: 99). From the perspective of 
memory politics, such a mnemonic actor provides the average memory-consumer 
with desired teleological direction vis-à-vis the present and future through perma-
nent unfolding, exploring, mastering, and exploiting of past traumas, victimization 
narratives, cults of soldiers and soldiering, mourning and sacrifices, heroic deeds, 
etc. All these serve either as tools for explaining the current social crisis, or for le-
gitimizing public policies regarding memory issues like those of naming or renam-
ing public places, placing or displacing monuments, shaping public discourse and 
media contents, etc. 
These two faces of mnemonic warriors are detrimental for political stability as 
well as for political pluralism in all societies affected with memory wars since the 
dominance of these actors in the public space can deepen mnemonic and social di-
vides and aggravate cultural traumas, as many cases show. For instance, this is the 
case in Spain regarding Franco’s legacy, in Italy regarding Mussolini and fascism, 
in Poland regarding communist terror, in Hungary both with the Nazi and com-
munist past, as it is the case in Croatia. Even though current memory wars reflect 
already existing ideological cleavages and radically opposed views of national his-
tory, recent deployments of memory politics likely entrench the polarized groups 
regarding their view of particular memory and symbols, or reinforce socio-political 
dichotomies instead of achieving reconciliatory effects. 
In the second part I will focus on the origins of memory politics in Croatia 
along with its ongoing memory wars, particularly in relation to the socio-political 
tensions regarding the public display of contested symbols and symbolic expres-
sions; in parts three and four this will be followed by an analysis of the Dialogue 
Document and its recommendations regarding symbolic expressions.
II. Land of Confusion: Origins of Memory Politics in Croatia
In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s past national memories became 
the source of contestations in the process of political disintegration, state-build-
ing and national self-identification. In the light of these historical ruptures, Croatia 
was becoming socially and politically traumatized, confused, and divided regard-
ing its conflicting narratives about the past. If we put aside the relationship toward 
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the “Other”, the Croatian political body has been fragmented within, based on the 
simplified so-called “Ustasha v. Partisans” divide that reflects two conflicting nar-
ratives related to Croatian historical experience during World War II (WWII) and 
the trauma behind them that has been perpetuating socio-political tension from the 
1990s to the present. Soon after the shocking unveilings of crimes related to the 
Yugoslav regime, especially those in the final days of WWII at Bleiburg and other 
mass execution sites,7 but also those related to communist repression in general in 
years and decades that followed, the founding narrative of “Brotherhood and Uni-
ty” that kept the Yugoslav country of different nations together was understood as a 
façade. Since the founding narrative collapsed along with the country, it was clear 
that the new Croatian state would need new founding moments, i.e. a reinvention of 
binding foundations. Although Bernal, when she discusses the concept of founding, 
articulates it as “a singular, superlative moment of origin and creation”, as well as 
a “point of consensus, agreement, and civic unity” that becomes “the source of uni-
versally binding commitments, beyond and above ordinary politics” (Bernal, 2017: 
3), new Croatian political actors were trying to provide a narrative on memory and 
history beyond a single moment of creation by emphasizing various, “previously 
unrecognized founding moments” (ibid.: 232) that led to the rebirth of the Cro-
atian state. This new outlook of Croatian founding has been articulated around the 
trauma of independence lost and regained that has been boiled down to a politico-
teleological narrative of Croatian “1000 year struggle” for independence. The focus 
of that founding narrative was, of course, the 20th-century Croatian struggle against 
the forces preventing the Croatian nation from fulfilling its centuries-long dream 
of an independent state. In this narrative the “Serbo-communist conspiracy” has 
7 In Croatian collective memory Bleiburg is a site of cultural trauma as well as a site of contes-
tation. The reason behind these polarized views on Bleiburg is related to the memory of WWII 
regarding the Yugoslav Partisans’ retaliations toward the military of the Ustasha regime of the 
Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, or NDH) on the one hand, as well 
as to the fact that commemoration has been used for some to flirt with the NDH regime, on the 
other hand. In the article devoted to the controversies regarding the Bleiburg commemoration 
Pavlaković et al. emphasize: “For the newly independent Croatia, Bleiburg had to be a symbol 
and metaphor for not only communist crimes committed during the war and immediately after 
it, but also for forty-five years of authoritarianism” (Pavlaković et al., 2018: 11-12). Accord-
ing to some realistic estimations, at Bleiburg the Yugoslav Army executed about 70000-80000 
people (see fn. 6 in: Pavlaković et al., 2018), mostly members of the defeated NDH military 
accompanied by some civilians, and additionally during the so-called Way of the Cross death 
marches. However, due to the fact that the Ustasha insignia and symbols can be seen during the 
commemoration, Austria proposed the new law expected to take force on 1 March 2019 with the 
expanded list of banned symbols including the Ustasha insignia (see: https://www.total-croatia-
news.com/politics/31443-austria-to-expand-list-of-banned-symbols-including-ustasha-insignia 
(retrieved 4 October 2018). 
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played the fundamental role irrespective of whether the focus was the time before 
WWII or after it in the period of the socialist Yugoslavia to the present.8 
The point of confusion was the time of WWII. From the perspective of the 
abovementioned politico-teleological narrative this struggle for an independent 
state, this trauma of not having an independent state has been embodied in a politi-
cal entity that actually called itself the Independent State of Croatia (NDH, or Neza-
visna Država Hrvatska), no matter how far it was from that description as a fascist 
creation dependent upon and supported by Nazi Germany. So, in the times of politi-
cal changes where new founding moments had to be rediscovered and retold, the 
legacy of the Croatian antifascist movement along with later communist dictator-
ship (of the proletariat, as the official ideology declared) has been weighed against 
the NDH project whose reminiscences survived among a part of the Croatian émi-
grés. Indeed, during political turmoil in which Yugoslav federation was slowly fall-
ing apart, Franjo Tuđman, Croatian historian and politician (later the first president 
of the Republic of Croatia), in his speech given at the 1st General Assembly of the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) articulated a new narrative of Croatian political 
founding that tied the struggle for independence in the past with various aspirations 
of leading Croatian thinkers and politicians from the 19th and 20th centuries, includ-
ing Starčević, Radić, and those from the Croatian antifascist left defending the right 
to self-determination (expressed in the AVNOJ and ZAVNOH principles, i.e. the 
principles of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, and 
the Territorial Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia). Although 
Tuđman was clear about reconciling Croatian antifascism and the struggle for inde-
pendence, his assessment of the NDH was a confusing message to the public, hav-
ing further implications for developing memory-related disputes, policies, and nar-
ratives in Croatia. This is what Tuđman said: 
The supporters of hegemonic-unitary or Yugoslav statist views see the HDZ pro-
gram goals as nothing more than a demand to reestablish the Ustasha NDH. By 
doing so, they are forgetting that the NDH was not only a mere “Quisling” entity 
and a “fascist crime”, but also an expression of the historic aspirations of the Cro-
atian people to establish their own state. It was also an expression of understanding 
of international factors, in this case the government of Hitler’s Germany, which 
8 For a detailed account of that perception, especially from the 1990s on, see: Cipek, 2017. He 
discusses the right-wing perception of that Croatian stereotype: “In the right-wing vision of the 
world, both the monarchist and the socialist Yugoslavia are thought of only as prisons of na-
tions dominated by the Serbs. And the communist dictatorship – through the theory of totalitari-
anism – is condemned as even worse than the fascist one, as well as expressed as a collective 
trauma” (ibid.: 159). Also this perception of the Serbo-communist conspiracy is known under 
the term “yugo-bolshevism” as one of the important elements in the ideology of Franjo Tuđman 
(Đurašković, 2016a).
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was, on the ruins of Versailles order, building a New European Order... Therefore, 
the NDH did not represent a mere whimsy of the Axis Powers, but also a conse-
quence of distinctive historic factors.9
While Tuđman’s view reflects his overall narrative of political founding that 
excluded rehabilitation of the crooked NDH regime, a residual footprint of this 
speech on many party members and supporters was likely different. Among the 
public it was “understood as a revisionist act” and as such it encouraged “some 
flirting with the Ustasha” that “were tacitly tolerated in line with the policies of na-
tional homogenization and reconciliation” (Pauković, 2012: 207-208). This is evi-
dent from the legal and political discourse in the 1990s that was, at the very least, 
confusing in the message that has been projected into the public. 
One of the key moments in Tuđman’s attempt to shape memory politics was his 
project of “national reconciliation” based on a narrative of the unfortunate historical 
fate of 20th-century Croatia being trapped between “the black and red totalitarian-
ism” (Radonić, 2012: 169), or the necessity for healing a divide between two failed 
Croatian projects – the “black” one, or the one that allied with the fascists and the 
Nazis during World War II, and the “red” one that has been viewed as an offspring 
of both communism and antifascism. This was another confusing moment in the 
Croatian memory politics. Tuđman’s project of national reconciliation imagined an 
overall commemorative monument that would symbolically provide national recon-
ciliation in death for the warring sides of WWII. This controversial idea proposed 
the bones of the NDH soldiers from Bleiburg, the Way of the Cross, and other mass 
execution sites to be brought to lie together with the bones of the NDH victims and 
antifascists in Jasenovac, the notorious WWII Ustasha concentration camp. This 
bizarre idea that would also symbolically “place the crimes of the Ustasha and the 
communists on equal ground” (Đurašković, 2016b: 7), was not Tuđman’s own. A 
similar project had already been known as a hallmark of the Spanish fascist dicta-
tor Francisco Franco. In an interview for the German Tageszeitung in July 1990 
Tuđman emphasized that burying fascist and communist victims together is a pre-
9 See: HDZ Herald, March 1990, p. 18, in: Pauković, 2012: 207, n. 95. For more on the topic, 
see Pauković’s whole chapter The Role of History in Legitimizing Politics in Transition in Cro-
atia. However, in the Historical Foundations of the Croatian Constitution this account of Cro-
atian aspirations was not articulated in that way. Rather, the Constitution explicitly states that 
Croatian millennial continuity of statehood has manifested itself, among all, “in the establish-
ment of the foundations of state sovereignty during the course of the Second World War, as ex-
pressed in the decision of the Territorial Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia 
(1943) in opposition to proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941), and then in the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Croatia (1947) and in all subsequent constitutions of 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1990)”. For the Croatian Constitution, see: http://www.
sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2406.
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requisite for reconciliation, while in April 1991, for the Croatian magazine Start, he 
further explained that he took his inspiration from Franco:
It is true that there were victims of fascism, but it is also true that the Croatian 
people suffered even more, as victims of the [Serbian WWII extreme nationalist 
movement] Chetniks and Communism. Let’s instead erect a monument to every-
one, like the one Franco did, in that way making possible the normal development 
of democracy in Spain.10
When Tuđman refers to Franco, he refers to his grandiose memorial entitled 
the Valle de los Cadíos (Valley of the Fallen) estimated to contain between 30000 
and 60000 people buried there. It was a place where all the victims from the Span-
ish Civil War were buried together (including Franco himself later11). For Franco, 
it was an urge to build an official monument of that type for conciliatory purposes. 
However, Franco’s project politicized memories in order to legitimize his view of 
the state through the discourse of theologico-political “Crusade” – the need for “the 
heroic sacrifices involved in the victory in war” (Preston, 1995: 42). In Croatia, due 
to severe criticism and a view that it was highly unethical to have a commemora-
tive place of that sort that puts on an equal footing the perpetrators and their vic-
tims, fascists and antifascists, the Croatian version of Franco’s Valley of the Fallen 
in Jasenovac never took place. It would probably aggravate tensions even more and 
further spark memory wars in Croatia, rather than serve as an example of national 
reconciliation. Similarly, the whole idea of national reconciliation of the past turned 
out to be loaded with memories and symbols that could hardly be reconcilable and 
that were, for these reasons, easily politicized from that time on.
10 See Milekic, 2017.
11 Based on the 2011 recommendations of the Spanish commission for facing the Francoist le-
gacy, the Spanish parliament recently voted to exhumate Franco from the Valley of the Fallen 
and hence to deprive the monument from being a shrine for Franco’s supporters and a continuous 
glorification of Francoism (see: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/franco-
spain-remains-move-civil-war-body-exhumed-relocate-valley-fallen-a8536186.html). The back-
ground of this decision is outlined in the Spanish Historical Memory Law (2007). It is interest-
ing that Spain wants other graves of prominent fascists to be removed as well, including those of 
Ante Pavelić and Vjekoslav Maks Luburić to be returned to Croatia (see: http://www.balkanin-
sight.com/en/article/ustasa-tombs-in-spain-could-be-removed-07-25-2018). While Ante Đapić, 
former leader of the Croatian Party of Right (HSP), and current leader of the political party 
DESNO argued that everyone has a right to be buried in his homeland (https://direktno.hr/direkt/
dapic-direktno-prijenos-posmrtnih-ostataka-poglavnika-pavelica-i-casnika-luburica-hrvatsku-
civilizac-129303/), Pavelić’s family had previously disagreed with the moving since Croatia as 
it is today is not what Pavelić was fighting for (see: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sto-
ce-biti-s-grobom-ante-pavelica-sedlar-paveliceve-posmrtne-ostatke-ne-bi-bilo-dobro-premjesti-
ti-u-rh/7667385/).
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Another controversy from the early 1990s linked to the beginning of the Home-
land War is an absence of resolute political action towards those flirting with the 
NDH legacy. This issue is related to the military unit of Croatian volunteers whose 
name, insignia, and especially the salute recently became the focal point of con-
troversy that has been fostering Croatian memory wars. We are talking here of the 
HOS militia (Hrvatske obrambene snage – Croatian Defense Forces), established 
during the Homeland War for independence by the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) 
that advocated for a resurrection of the NDH. At the level of discourse, it was not 
a coincidence that the HOS used the historical acronym for the NDH joined mili-
tary troops from late November 1944 known as the Croatian Armed Forces (Hrvat-
ske oružane snage – HOS, made out of the Home Guards/Domobrani and Ustasha 
army). Furthermore, after the fall of the NDH regime, the same acronym with the 
same meaning was used among the Ustasha émigrés as the name for military for-
mations reestablished from “those who managed to flee... located around the globe” 
(Tokić, 2018: 76) with the goal to operate as a military opposition to the Yugoslav 
regime. Since picking that acronym did not come out of the blue, this was deliber-
ate flirting with the fascist NDH in which the only important thing was the narra-
tive that this was the entity that reestablished Croatian longings for their own state 
irrespective of its legal character, the atrocities committed, and the fact that this was 
neither an independent, nor a sovereign political entity. Hence, this was again flirt-
ing with the discredited past and as such a confusing message to the public. 
It should be noted that even though Tuđman’s memory politics in the early 
1990s endorsed the idea of national reconciliation similar to the abovementioned 
Franco’s model, it opposed validating the NDH and Ustasha insignia as legitimate 
ideas and symbols to be linked with democratic Croatia. This is important to notice 
in relation to the HOS controversy that has been dividing Croatia until the present 
time, especially in relation to the insignia they were using during the Homeland 
War. Even though the HOS was integrated in the Croatian Army during 1992, it 
was not recognized under this name since the Ministry of Administration in 1995 
claimed that “the HOS is not a legal and legitimate form of organizing Croatian citi-
zens in the defense of the Homeland”.12 This reflects earlier Tuđman’s critique of 
the HOS as the militia “decorated with the Ustasha insignia”13 that included flirting 
12 However, after Tuđman’s death, according to the legal framework related to the ways in which 
civic association can be formed, the Association of the HOS volunteers registered in 2001 along 
with its For the Homeland Ready insignia. It is ironic that it happened during the left-wing go-
vernment. See an interview with Dobroslav Paraga, the original organizer of the HOS militia, in 
Croatian: https://direktno.hr/domovina/udrugu-bojovnika-hos-a-zajedno-s-grbom-i-pozdravom-
registrirao-je-sdp-90212/. 
13 See Croatian source: Slobodna Dalmacija, 2 September 1992, as well as: Veselinović, 2016: 80. 
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with the black color of the uniforms (as it was the color of the NDH Black Legion), 
as well as with the controversial salute For the Homeland Ready (za dom spremni) 
known as the official salute of the Ustasha regime. Around the same time in 1992, 
in an interview for a TV station, Tuđman, while discussing the problem with the 
HOS volunteers, was clear that memory politics means facing fascism, not flirting 
with fascist insignia, and embracing antifascism as a standard of narrative in con-
temporary democracies: 
I know that among these young men there were Croatian fanatics, Croatian people 
who had Croatian ideals, but surprisingly they came to those who dress them into 
black shirts and fascist marks from the lost World War II. Where would Germany 
be if it continued the black-shirted and brown-shirted traditions? This was one of 
the major obstacles to Croatia’s international recognition. This is something the 
world cannot accept. Today’s world is built on the principles of the antifascist 
coalition.14
However, Tuđman’s public disapproval of this flirting with the Ustasha legacy 
had no legal consequences, since the government did not ban the usage of these in-
signia. It shows either the government’s tacit tolerance regarding these symbolic ex-
pressions, yet without endorsing a free speech argument, or the lack of legal power 
to translate these verbal criticisms into punitive measures. This absence of a clear 
stance toward the HOS insignia from the very beginning fosters social confusion 
regarding the official memory politics, since, as Heinze pointed out, “not to legis-
late is also to legislate. Legal power acts through law’s proceedings but also through 
law’s abstentions” (Heinze, 2017: 420). 
But this confusing discourse related to the NDH legacy has continued. In Oc-
tober 1993 the Croatian Parliament passed an addition to the law regarding the pen-
sion system. Accordingly, those who served in the NDH military were granted an 
appropriate pension relative to their time spent in service during the war, or in cus-
tody after the war.15 This act was controversial, although not unique. In Yugoslavia 
the pensions were provided for the antifascist (Partisan) fighters from WWII and 
this practice has continued in Croatia. Instead of questioning the inherited Yugo-
slav pension system, the new addition to the law equalized all fighters in WWII ir-
respective of the side they were fighting for. This controversial legal move, as said, 
is not unique, since it could be found in Germany that provides pension rights to 
their former Nazis with war disabilities, including convicted war criminals, as well 
14 See, in Croatian: https://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/533734/evo-
sto-je-franjo-tuman-govorio-o-hos-u-i-ustaskim-simbolima.
15 See: Zakon o dopunama Zakona o mirovinskom i invalidskom osiguranju. The link to the offi-
cial document in Croatian: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1993_10_96_1883.html.
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as to foreign volunteers like those from the Spanish fascist Blue Division that were 
fighting hand in hand with the Nazis.16 However, this was not the only controversy 
regarding the Croatian pension system here. Actually, at the level of semantics, this 
pension law named the NDH forces the Homeland Army (Domovinska vojska). 
Therefore, such legal discourse basically linked the concept of “homeland” that 
became a synonym for Croatia in the 1990s and allowed for the NDH forces to ap-
propriate the same concept used for designating the Croatian war for independence 
known as the Homeland War. 
Furthermore, in 1996, in the light of Tuđman’s ongoing memory politics of 
national reconciliation, another confusing message was sent to the public when 
“the Remembrance Day for Croatian Victims in the Struggle for Freedom and In-
dependence (Dan spomena na hrvatske žrtve u borbi za slobodu i nezavisnost)” 
(Pavlaković et al., 2018: 12) was linked to the Bleiburg commemoration. While 
massive killings of the surrendered people (soldiers and civilians) around the Aus-
trian town of Bleiburg can be viewed as the hallmark of the Yugoslav Army’s re-
taliations, and along with the Way of the Cross, the paradigm of communist mass 
violations of human rights, it is questionable to link these victims with the freedom 
fighters due to the discredited nature of the political entity they were fighting for. 
For Tuđman it was enough to view the warring sides as having legitimate aspira-
tions for freedom and self-determination, regardless of the fact that he emphasized 
earlier (during the 1st General Assembly of the HDZ in 1989) that the NDH was a 
“fascist crime”.17 Indeed, the aspirations of Croats to have their own nation-state 
were legitimate, but these legitimate aspirations do not deny the fascist character 
of that state. Therefore, Tuđman’s memory politics regarding naming the Bleiburg 
commemoration day as the one that should remind the Croatian people of their free-
dom fighters further confuses the official founding narrative. Namely, if the NDH 
military can be semantically equalized with the Croatian antifascists, or if those 
victims were basically labeled as freedom fighters for Croatian statehood, then it is 
highly confusing how the antifascist fighters and their ZAVNOH legacy have been 
enunciated as one of the founding premises of contemporary Croatia as it is outlined 
in the Historical Foundations of the Croatian Constitution. If the NDH was “a fas-
cist crime”, than its legal order that was embedding terror as its modus operandi, 
discredited those aspirations for Croatian statehood. In other words, if those aspira-
tions were tainted, if they were, due to particular historical conditions, bounded in 
16 For more about this: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/10/world/germany-defends-pensions-
for-ss-veterans.html, and https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11994794/
Spains-Nazi-volunteers-defend-their-right-to-recognition-and-German-pensions.html. 
17 In an interview given to the German Tageszeitung in July 1990, Tuđman said: “Croats fought 
for freedom under different flags” (Milekic, 2017). 
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fascist methods and racial legal system, than any semantic and legal flirting with the 
NDH legacy of that sort further aggravates social divisions and relegates facing this 
difficult part of Croatian historical memory. Unfortunately, the victims of commu-
nist terror and its commemoration were occasionally exploited to tacitly sensitize 
the public, or sometimes even to glorify the NDH project. 
Recent outbursts of memory wars that were boiled down to the social disputes 
related to the usage of For the Homeland Ready salute/insignia as well as, to a de-
gree, to the five-pointed red star controversy, reflect the inability of Croatia to face 
its past openly and without deliberate confusions. Due to an ever-present political 
unwillingness to deal with these controversial symbolic expressions, the social con-
fusions have intensified over the last decade, especially after a couple of incidents 
at football stadiums and concerts. Therefore, the salute/insignia For the Homeland 
Ready, whose criminalization has been required by some political actors and so-
cial groups, became the most controversial issue in Croatian memory wars. Such 
confused memory politics yielded a fractured society18 with numerous mnemonic 
actors willing to politicize memories and traumatic history. Symbolic expressions 
became a battleground for political reevaluation of the past, and various mnemonic 
warriors have started to deepen already existing confusions and social tensions re-
garding two failed pre-1990s political projects. This led to various controversial as-
sessments and judgments regarding the legality and legitimacy of using symbolic 
expressions, as I have shown elsewhere (Cvijanović, 2016).19 For all these reasons 
the government decided to adopt a systematic approach toward the politics of me-
mory, yet not without further confusions and controversies. 
III. Facing Communism: Dialogue Document 
as the Anti-Communist Manifesto 
In response to numerous political and civic initiatives for providing a framework for 
dealing with legal ambiguities regarding symbolic expressions and difficult memo-
ries, in 2017 the Croatian government established the Council for Dealing with the 
Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, a kind of “truth commission” aiming to 
provide a document that would serve as a beckon in contemporary wastelands of 
Croatian legal and political confusions how to handle difficult memories and their 
symbolic projections. The Council was perceived, however, not just as a body that 
would carve a way out of legal inconsistencies and confusions in approaching the 
18 Or “regime”, according to Bernhard and Kubik. They argue that after the fall of communism 
the post-communist regimes became predominantly either fractured, namely characterized with 
strong mnemonic cleavages, or unified regimes (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014). 
19 Available in Croatian only.
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disputed symbols and salutes that were polarizing society while being regularly po-
liticized predominantly in relations to the veteran population, but moreover as an 
attempt at renewing national dialogue about the past, as a step toward new politics 
of reconciliation. Predominantly made of numerous experts in the field of law, his-
tory, and political science, the Council’s purpose was to draft, on the one hand, a 
frame for the government’s memory politics that would contain comprehensive re-
commendations aimed at facing the “difficult past” that would include shaping the 
educational curricula, dealing with controversial anniversaries such as commemo-
rations, providing a framework for the politics of public space (i.e. the politics of 
naming and renaming streets, squares, etc., and moving or removing the monu-
ments of those understood to be controversial political figures from the past), and 
on the other hand, similar clear-cut recommendations for regulating the use of insig-
nia and symbols related to undemocratic regimes. The Council, however, cautiously 
articulated that its mission was not to rank “totalitarian repression of single phases 
of those regimes which were subject to change, but to deal with those practices and 
meanings the consequences of which may be felt today, and which are sometimes 
even positively evoked by certain political groups, thus causing conflicts which dis-
turb citizens and spread hatred” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 1).20 By doing that, the 
Council adopted a wary as well as inconsistent interpretive approach in evaluating 
historical memories and symbolic expressions, hence yielding incoherent assess-
ments and conclusions that can hardly reduce disputes about historical memory in 
Croatia. 
The Dialogue Document is twofold: on the one hand, it provides a narrative 
about Croatian experiences with both totalitarian traumas – fascist and communist 
– of the 20th century, and on the other hand, it aspires to serve as a declaratory me-
mory law with prescriptions aiming “to confer solemnity upon a brutal past” 
(Heinze, 2017: 417), although not purely declaratory since its recommendations 
might yield punitive regulatory actions if integrated in the legal system.21 This has 
been clear from its subtitle: Postulates and Recommendations – On Specific Nor-
mative Regulation of Symbols, Emblems and other Insignia of Totalitarian Regimes 
20 It is interesting to note that the Council identified the origins of fascist terror in the monarchist 
Yugoslavia prior to WWII: “The first fascist organization in the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats 
and Serbs, more precisely in Croatia, was the Yugoslav Progressive Nationalist Youth/Organiza-
tion of Yugoslav nationalists (ORJUNA), founded in 1921 as a pro-regime, monarchist and uni-
tarianist organisation that terrorized and even assassinated Croatian patriots and workers’ rights 
advocates” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 3).
21 For detailed and instructive distinctions between declaratory non-regulatory memory laws on 
the one hand, and regulatory memory laws that might be non-punitive or punitive on the other, 
see: Heinze, 2017.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 109-146
124
and Movements.22 What draws attention from the beginning is a sort of disclaimer 
that the Dialogue Document makes when approaching the memories of fascist and 
communist crimes. For the creators of the Document it was important to emphasize 
in its foundational postulates “an asymmetry between well-known fascist crimes 
which were publicly condemned and long covered up and less investigated com-
munist crimes” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 5). According to my view, this assess-
ment becomes important since it possibly explains the whole narrative regarding 
the crimes of undemocratic regimes focused on the communist terror. Instead of fair 
and proportionate descriptions of fascist and communist state-sponsored politics of 
terror, the role of political leaders of these regimes in supporting legal framework 
and repressive apparatus that led to gross violations of human rights, we have con-
fusing and imbalanced dealings with history, memory, and symbols. On the one 
hand, the Document outlines the responsibility of the communist regime in un-
dermining antifascism to an extent by “converting it into an ideologeme under the 
guise of which mass crimes and human rights violations were committed”, and 
states that occasional “misuse of antifascism” is “aimed at discrediting political 
opponents and in some cases to negate or criminalise Croatia’s statehood and in-
dependence that was won in the Homeland War” (ibid.: 4-5). This assessment ob-
viously only partially deals with the communist past, but rather points toward the 
ghoul of communism that has been cloaked in antifascism and as such is portrayed 
as an ever-present danger for the Croatian state. Such a message is again confus-
ing at the very least, if not problematic, since antifascism is not necessarily linked 
with communism. But even if the Document targets such “antifascist” tendencies 
that were attempting to discredit contemporary “Croatia’s statehood and indepen-
dence that was won in the Homeland War”, it is far from clear, based on these vague 
statements, who should be targeted and for what reasons in particular. On the other 
hand, there were no similar accounts about what the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) is responsible for in relation to cultural trauma. Actually, the NDH was ac-
knowledged only as a political entity opposed to the fundaments of the Croatian 
Constitution, but the Document is silent regarding particular crimes of that regime, 
as well as about possible discrediting of “Croatia’s statehood and independence that 
was won in the Homeland War” due to proliferation in popular use of the Ustasha 
insignia and salutes under the guise of readopting an old pre-WWII Croatian tradi-
tion, or due to the fact that these insignia were part of the Homeland War legacy. 
For those reasons the flaw of the Document’s foundational postulates is in the 
narrative that is not only biased in evaluating both regimes, but also revisionist in a 
22 For the English version of the Dialogue Document, see: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsIma-
ges//Vijesti/2018/05%20svibanj/5%20svibnja//DOKUMENT%20DIJALOGA%20ENG.pdf 
(retrieved 8 October 2018).
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sense that there were no genuine attempts to discuss fascist crimes. The irony is that 
these crimes are only generally implied in the statement about communist crimes 
in the sentence stating how “serious crimes and human rights violations were also 
committed during the communist rule...” (ibid.: 5, my emphasis), so the reader might 
assume that there were other crimes prior to the era of communist terror. If an alien 
were to read the Document, he would have the impression that only the crimes of 
communism really matter, since the reader is unable to get any information from the 
text about a single fascist crime. While the Document correctly and clearly names 
particular communist crimes such as the “Bleiburg tragedy” and the “all-powerful 
communist repressive police apparatus” that committed grave crimes against hu-
manity through its “bloody reprisals against the Catholic Church and peasants (‘ku-
laks’), confiscation of property and persecution of the ‘class enemy’ and political 
opponents”, including their own “Party members during the purges of ‘cominform-
ists’ (Goli otok)”23 (ibid.: 4), at the same time fascist crimes are veiled with a “deaf-
ening silence”.24 Communist terror and its crimes in the aftermath of WWII as well 
as in the following decades were large-scale crimes against humanity by definition. 
However, by being silent about the NDH racial laws that enabled the whole spectra 
of state-sponsored terror (repression, mass executions, deportations, etc.) against the 
“blacklisted” minorities (Jews, Serbs, and the Roma people, among all), by ignoring 
to mention explicitly the horrors of the concentration camps in the NDH – by not 
even mentioning “Jasenovac as the most prominent substantive and symbolic ex-
pression of that creation” (Kasapović, 2018: 11) – the Document not only fails in its 
opportunity to seriously confront Croatian society with its difficult past, except only 
in a declaratory fashion and in general terms, but also leaves an aura of revisionism 
in the air.25 It does not mean that the Document denies these horrors, but at the very 
least, if not deliberately, it willy-nilly reboots collective memories by allowing for 
23 Goli otok is the name of the Croatian island that had served first as a political prison and labor 
camp for alleged Stalinists (after a while also for regular prisoners), so in the public discourse it 
is also used as a metaphor for communist terror.
24 Page uses the term “deafening silence” as an inadequate “typical response to the fascist past” 
pointing at the presence of Mussolini’s heritage in Italy, both in terms of architecture as well as 
political life (Page, 2016: 134-140).
25 In his dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document, Željko Tanjić puts forward an ironic 
statement that we could “admire the Croatian Constitution that discarded the NDH despite his-
torical aspirations of the Croatian people for a free and independent state”. It is not clear to 
whom this “complaint” has been addressed, but it seems that it targets those “founding fathers” 
of the Croatian Constitution, more particularly Franjo Tuđman as the author of its Historical 
Foundations. See: Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Željko Tanjić, available in 
Croatian only at the following link: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20
veljača/28%20veljače/Mišljenje%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Željka%20Tanjića.pdf.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 109-146
126
their absence. In that sense, the foundational postulates of the Document sound more 
like an anti-communist manifesto than a fair assessment of both totalitarian terrors. 
The Council’s justification is that unlike fascist crimes, “the issues of crimes and vic-
tims of communist regimes (globally and in Croatia) remain ambiguous or at least 
unexplored, leaving the possibility of further antagonism within society” (Dialogue 
Document, 2018: 15). However, as the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty said: 
“The absence of a sign can be a sign” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 44). Here, the silence 
is a sign that the Document’s foundations are deeply compromised and thus flawed.
IV. Stars and Salutes: Dialogue Document 
and Disputed Symbolic Expressions 
The Document’s interpretative reflections about the origins of memory wars in Cro-
atia represent the basis for recommendations for potential legal penalties related to 
public use of controversial symbols and symbolic expressions. Accordingly, the 
Council inquired into differentiating among symbols and their meanings, yet not 
only those related to the period of communist and fascist rule, but also those from 
the Homeland War and the armed aggression against Croatia in the 1990s. So, what 
is the Council’s take on symbols and symbolic expressions? There are a few general 
problems regarding symbols that the Dialogue Document wants to address: 
a) relationship between symbolic expressions and freedom of speech;
b) differing between intentions of symbolic expressions;
c) classifying symbolic expressions according to their meanings; 
d) exceptions from punitive regulations.
The Council’s overall view implicates that not all symbols of hate are created 
equal. On the one hand, this view draws on the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, or the Court) related to the five-pointed red star case, the 
issue that divides not only Croatia, but Europe as well. On the other hand, when 
discussing the most controversial symbolic expression in recent Croatian memory 
wars – For the Homeland Ready salute – concessions are made for the sake of “the 
necessity of balancing” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 27). Let me go through the out-
lined points in order to address these controversial conclusions that not only made 
no difference in leveling social divisions, but had actually riven the Council itself 
by yielding various dissenting opinions. This has shown that there is a deep social 
divide not only in relation to the difficult past, but also in the way in which memory 
politics should be approached.
First, the Dialogue Document relies on international and domestic legal frame-
works when discussing freedoms and their limitations regarding symbolic expres-
sion. Quoting the Court’s interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights, it is said that “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foun-
dations of a democratic society” and that “it is applicable not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb”; but, as “set forth in 
Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions, which must, however, 
be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convin-
cingly” (ibid.: 9). It is understood that these restrictions are outlined in Article 39 of 
the Croatian Constitution that bans incitement to war or use of violence as well as 
any call for hatred or intolerance, and that these provisions have been enacted into 
the Criminal Code under Article 325 that sanctions hatred and intolerance, as well 
as under Article 235 that prescribes punitive measures for anyone “who publicly 
approves of, denies or grossly trivialises the crimes of genocide, crimes of aggres-
sion, crimes against humanity or war crimes directed against a group of persons 
or a member of such a group on account of their race, religion, national or ethnic 
origin, descent or colour, in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against 
such a group or a member of such a group” (ibid.: 7). While these legal articulations 
belong to the standard language of human rights and protections against violence, 
intolerance, and discrimination based on someone’s identity features, the problem 
appears in interpreting symbolic expressions, namely when the Council starts to 
weigh between intentions of various symbolic expressions without grounding its 
view explicitly. Without providing any clue of what the Council has in mind, the 
Document says that some symbolic expressions might be taken “as a provocation”, 
while others as those that commemorate “tragic events from the past”, hence those 
being provocative could be sanctioned “in the context of disturbing the public or-
der and peace or disturbing citizens” (ibid.: 14). Although it is not explicitly stated, 
this view leans on the Croatian Misdemeanor Act on Public Order and Peace, spe-
cifically Article 1 that prohibits disturbing public order and peace in a very broad 
and vague sense (i.e. all behavior that yields unrest, indisposition, uneasiness, in-
sults public morality, etc.) and as such having detrimental outcomes for free speech 
(Cvijanović, 2016: 100-101). On top of that, along with the vagueness of the legi-
slative framework, the Document’s proposal is basically in conflict with its previ-
ous endorsement of those provisions from Article 10 of the European Convention 
according to which public expressions might be offensive, shocking, and disturb-
ing for some people. Furthermore, it would be hardly possible to reach a broader 
consensus about what has to be considered offensive or disturbing in the context of 
highly polarized views about certain symbolic expressions and memories. For ex-
ample, waving the red star symbol as well as having a public celebration of Tito’s 
birthday can be viewed as a provocation along with glorification, as it would pro-
bably be if someone wore the red star in a church. Also, in that context, what sym-
bolic expressions would fit commemoration of victims of the Bleiburg tragedy and 
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the Way of the Cross, if any? Finally, what should be done when provocations might 
involve coded symbols, namely those not recognized by the legislator, or the gene-
ral public, but the particular group that has been targeted?
Accepting the view that not all symbols are created equal, namely that there 
is presupposed inequality among symbols grounded in their meanings, the Coun-
cil attempted to differentiate between inherent meanings of controversial symbolic 
expressions termed “disputed insignia of hate” that belong to “totalitarian regimes 
or movements”, namely “fascism (including National Socialism, the Ustasha move-
ment, and the Chetnik movement) and communism” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 
19). In order to make any differentiation between meanings possible, the Council 
adopted a terminology of ambiguous versus unambiguous symbolic expressions that 
have been used in recent European jurisprudence. However, it turns out that apply-
ing this differentiation in the Document is incoherent and inconsistent, and hence 
questionable for carving out any legal outcomes based on these recommendations. 
First of all, we should be aware that any ambition to single out unambigu-
ous from ambiguous symbolic representations would be at odds with the multiple 
meanings/ambiguousness argument if we take semiotics and symbolism seriously. 
According to Cohen, “symbols are objects, acts, relationships or linguistic forma-
tions that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and 
impel men to action” (Cohen, 1976: 23). Therefore, one of the most important fea-
tures of a symbol is that it “holds different meanings to different persons and to the 
same person at different times” (ibid.: 24). It means that, for example, the German 
Iron Cross can be used as the German military symbol, but also might be perceived 
as a symbol being part of the official Nazi insignia during WWII along with the 
swastika. The fact that every symbol generates culture-specific meaning, i.e. not li-
teral (denotative) but various connotative meanings shaped through particular time 
and space is the very property of a symbol. Symbolic expressions gain their mean-
ing through particular culture, through connotation, they communicate meanings 
in such ways that these meanings are not fixed, but depend on socially established 
agreement. As Berger put it: “Semiotically speaking, symbols are things with im-
portant historical and cultural meaning” (Berger, 2010: 14). Hence we talk about 
cultural symbols. If there is a disagreement about the meaning of symbolic expres-
sions, we have socially contentious symbols. Thus, the whole argument that there is 
a dividing line between ambiguous and unambiguous symbols and that this division 
is immune to the changes in perception of a symbol over time, that the meaning can 
be fixed, is semiotically flawed. 
However, according to the Council’s proposition, disputed insignia that should 
be deemed unambiguous, called also “prima facie disputed insignia of hate”, are 
qualified that way “because they are created precisely to identify the regimes and 
movements they belong to” and “their criminal and genocide policy” among all, and 
Cvijanović, H., On Memory Politics and Memory Wars: A Critical Analysis...
129
as a result are assigned to “the insignia of fascism in all its manifestations” (Dia-
logue Document, 2018: 22-23). As for ambiguous insignia of hate, it is argued that 
they hold multiple meanings, in other words their meanings have a shape-shifting 
property, so they can take either legitimate or illegitimate shape. 
In the context of the European jurisprudence, the multiple meanings argument 
was linked notably to the five-pointed red star controversy, also known as the Vajnai 
v. Hungary (2008) case. Actually, the case was dealing with freedom of speech, but 
it became paradigmatic because of the multiple meanings argument that has been 
occasionally cited in the Croatian context, as well as in the Council’s Document. 
According to Hungary’s legal regulations regarding the use of totalitarian symbols 
(Article 269B), the use of the five-pointed red star in public was forbidden along 
with other totalitarian symbols such as the swastika, the SS insignia, the arrow-
cross, and the hammer and sickle. So after the Hungarian applicant in this case was 
convicted for wearing totalitarian symbols during demonstrations, the case ended 
up in the European Court (ECtHR). It decided that the five-pointed red star con-
tains multiple meanings: it is viewed as a totalitarian symbol related to the era of 
communism and its “mass violations of human rights” that indeed “discredited the 
symbolic value of the red star”,26 however it is also argued that this symbol has been 
used legitimately and legally in various political organizations – from the interna-
tional workers’ movement to various political parties. The ECtHR acknowledged 
that this symbol might be disrespectful and could “create uneasiness amongst past 
victims and their relatives”, but curbing freedom of speech in the name of protect-
ing someone’s state of mind was considered unacceptable since “a legal system 
which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of pub-
lic feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social 
needs recognized in a democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable 
in its judgment”.27 From the Croatian perspective, however, this judgment is in dis-
crepancy with all-inclusive punitive provisions of the Croatian Misdemeanor Act 
on Public Order and Peace, specifically Article 1 that, as I mentioned earlier, is in 
favor of protecting public feelings by penalizing acts that might cause “uneasiness” 
among the public, and not in favor of protecting freedom of speech as outlined.28
26 Vajnai v. Hungary, ECtHR (2008), para. 52. I discussed this case as well earlier in: Cvijanović, 
2016. Also, for a more detailed account of this case relevant for the discussion regarding the 
problem of regulating symbolic expressions, see Gardašević’s article in this collection.
27 Vajnai v. Hungary, ECtHR (2008), para. 57. 
28 This explanation of the ECtHR can be compared to the decision of the American Supreme 
Court in the case Cohen v. California (1971) in which the speaker is defined as the one who de-
termines the content of the speech, not the government that cannot act as a guardian of public 
morality, as I have discussed in Cvijanović, 2016. 
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Following the Vajnai case the ECtHR repeated the multiple meanings argument 
related to the disputed symbol in Fáber v. Hungary (2012). The case is interesting 
since the applicant was holding the Hungarian Árpád flag that has been disputed 
as the flag that resembled the flag of the Arrow Cross Party during WWII known 
as the Nazi collaborators responsible for mass executions and deportations of Jews 
and Roma people. The police approached the applicant to remove the flag or leave 
the site close to the place where massive exterminations of Jews were happening 
during WWII by the Arrow Cross regime, the site that was picked for these sym-
bolic reasons for the Hungarian Socialist Party’s (MSZP) rally against racism and 
hatred. The Hungarian domestic courts penalized the applicant based on the view 
that the applicant was “disturbing public tranquility” since “the display was capa-
ble of causing public disorder”.29 However, the ECtHR dismissed this argument. 
The applicant opposed to the domestic court’s view that “the use of the flag had 
been harmful of provocative”, claiming also that the flag has been considered his-
torical and “not being a totalitarian or banned symbol under Hungarian law”, so its 
use could not indicate “any potential or actual hostility or aggression either”.30 The 
ECtHR protected freedom of speech as well as freedom of assembly even though 
the provocative flag was displayed close to the site of piety, arguing that “the dis-
play of a symbol associated with a political movement or entity, like that of a flag, is 
capable of expressing identification with ideas or representing them and falls within 
the ambit of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention. When the right to 
freedom of expression is exercised in the context of political speech through the use 
of symbols, utmost care must be observed in applying any restrictions, especially if 
the case involves symbols which have multiple meanings”, and adding that “inter-
fering with freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement 
to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unaccep-
table certain views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to 
democracy and often even endanger it”.31 It should be noted that in the Fáber case 
it is not perfectly clear how to interpret “rejection of democratic principles” since 
the Court obviously did not hold that displaying the disputed flag endangered these 
principles. Therefore, the ECtHR did not penalize the applicant even though his 
display of the Hungarian Árpád flag was viewed as “fascist”32 by the Hungarian So-
cialist Party members that were having a rally near the site of mass killings of Jews 
in WWII, as already mentioned. It is interesting that the Court did not find proble-
29 Fáber v. Hungary, ECtHR (2012), para. 51 and para. 53. See also Gardašević’s article in this 
collection.
30 Fáber v. Hungary, ECtHR (2012), para. 27.
31 Ibid., para. 36 and also para. 37.
32 Ibid., para. 52.
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matic having a counter-demonstration in the close vicinity of the site that is gene-
rally viewed as the site of piety; however, emphasizing that time and place matter 
when deciding about restricting controversial symbols with multiple meanings hav-
ing in mind national memories and traumas:
The Court does not exclude that the display of a contextually ambiguous symbol 
at the specific site of mass murders may in certain circumstances express identi-
fication with the perpetrators of those crimes; it is for this reason that even other-
wise protected expression is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. 
In certain countries with a traumatic historical experience comparable to that of 
Hungary, a ban on demonstrations – to be held on a specific day of remembrance 
– which are offensive to the memory of the victims of totalitarianism who pe-
rished at a given site may be considered to represent a pressing social need. The 
need to protect the rights to honour the murdered and the piety rights of their rela-
tives may necessitate an interference with the right to freedom of expression, and 
it might be legitimate when the particular place and time of the otherwise pro-
tected expression unequivocally changes the meaning of a certain display. Similar 
considerations apply if the expression, because of its timing and place, amounts 
to the glorification of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide (see Ga-
raudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR2003–IX (extracts)). Moreover, where 
the applicant expresses contempt for the victims of a totalitarian regime as such, 
this may amount – in application of Article 17 of the Convention – to an abuse of 
Convention rights (see Witzsch v. Germany (dec.), no. 41448/98, 20 April 1999). 
However, the Court is satisfied that in the instant case no such abusive element 
can be identified.33
The ECtHR related this case to the Vajnai case in which the ban of the red 
star as “a symbol used by a totalitarian regime in Hungary” is viewed problematic 
since it would “set the limits of freedom of expression” that were solely based on 
the sentiments that this symbol induces in the public.34 Based on both adjudications 
in the cases mentioned, the ECtHR was in favor of protecting freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly, hence allowing for the display of contentious symbolic 
expressions whose restrictions regarding the commemorative events and the sights 
of piety has to be strictly confined to particular “time and place”, for example “a 
specific day of remembrance”.35 In that sense, the Court’s adjudications resemble 
the American Supreme Court’s juridical practice in its defense of freedom of speech 
by flirting with “viewpoint neutrality and inadmissibility of content-based restric-
tions” (Belavusau, 2013: 47) that disallows discrimination among symbolic expres-
33 Ibid., para. 58. 
34 Ibid., para. 57 (also see Vajnai, para. 57).
35 Ibid., para. 58.
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sions, as one of the concurring opinions in the Fáber case notified too, stating that 
the Court’s approach is “if a left wing political symbol is allowed, irrespective of 
the consequences that its exposing may produce, then a right wing symbol should 
be allowed as well”.36
However, the advocates of the bans would claim that freedom of speech should 
be taken secondary when disputed symbolic expressions are at stake since these 
aggravate cultural trauma, yield fractured society with deep socio-political cleava-
ges, and hence could be detrimental for national reconciliation. From this point of 
view, it is problematic that protecting freedom of speech invalidates the argument 
that certain disputed symbols can be linked with the regimes that were deliberately 
using these symbolic expressions to systematically violate human rights to the high-
est proportions. Namely, even though the ECtHR as well as the Dialogue Docu-
ment condemn the communist totalitarian terror, and emphasize that as a result of 
its crimes against humanity the five-pointed red star symbol has been discredited, 
as it is claimed in the Vajnai case, it is concluded that this symbol carries a positive 
meaning too. Regardless of this line of arguing, due to the fact that society is deeply 
polarized in this case, the five-pointed red star controversy can be seen as the witt-
gensteinian “rabbit-duck illusion” – either you view it as a positive or negative sym-
bol; it cannot be both at the same time. The ECtHR’s explanation is questionable 
since its assessment is backed-up, among all, with a claim that “there is no evidence 
to suggest that there is a real and present danger of any political movement or party 
restoring the communist dictatorship” and adding that the “Government have not 
shown the existence of such a threat prior to the enactment of the ban in question”.37 
This explanation is flawed since it, misguidedly, invokes the “real and present dan-
ger” test or a “threat” argument that would legitimize any immediate ban, while this 
issue has nothing to do with the purpose of a possible ban which can be viewed as 
symbolic prohibition of a symbol that has been inflaming memory wars. If, how-
ever, we applied the “real and present danger” test in this case as well as in the case 
of displaying any fascist symbol, then it would be difficult to prove the existence 
of such danger in democracies aside from a possibility for incitement of violence 
in very controlled conditions. In addition, the “real and present danger” test can be 
misguidedly used as an argument in favor of banning communist symbols (along 
with fascist symbols), but there is no real danger of restoring communism (or fas-
cism) in these societies, so the argument of that sort is flawed. Rather, any meaning-
ful ban, if there is such, should be based on the demands for historical justice and 
memories, so the injuries from the past could not be relativized. If the ECtHR ar-
36 Concurring opinion of judge Popović joined by judge Berro-Lefèvre, in: Fáber v. Hungary, 
ECtHR (2012), p. 26.
37 Vajnai v. Hungary, ECtHR (2008), para. 49.
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gued that “serious crimes had been committed by the security forces of totalitarian 
regimes, whose official symbols included the red star”,38 it is highly dubious how 
it came to the following conclusion: “These violations of human rights could not, 
however, discredit the ideology of communism as such, let alone challenge the po-
litical values symbolised by the red star.”39 Some could not only argue that the very 
communist ideology presupposes violations of human rights through its revolutio-
nary program and strategy whose goal was, among all, violent “abolition of bour-
geois property” (Marx & Engels, 1978: 486), but such official statements create a 
perception about double standards in judging totalitarian regimes. Namely, it seems 
that not all crimes were treated equal when facing the consequences of totalitarian 
regimes, that eradication of the class enemy, the enemy of the people, or the enemy 
of the revolution (including their own members) is not perceived the same as eradi-
cation of the racial enemy. 
However, it should be pointed out that, unlike the European Court’s vindica-
tion of symbolic expression that has been discredited, the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court did not disregard the burden of comparable discredited symbolic expression, 
as it was the case with the ECtHR. Namely, in the case of street naming and renam-
ing, the Slovenian Constitutional Court acknowledged the multiple meanings argu-
ment, but decided not to draw the same conclusions as the ECtHR. In other words, 
the multiple meanings argument is not viewed as an argument that can be used to 
prohibit banning a controversial symbol if this symbol can be in any way associated 
with the crimes against humanity, because this would be enough to discredit the 
public use of controversial symbolic expression. Specifically, the Slovenian Con-
stitutional Court banned Tito’s name for the street in the Slovenian capital claim-
ing that his antifascism is not sufficient for vindicating his communist repressive 
regime and him as a symbol of that regime. The court argued:
The name Tito does not only symbolize the liberation of the territory of present-
day Slovenia from the Fascist occupation in World War II, as alleged by the op-
posing party, it also symbolises the post-war totalitarian communist regime, which 
was marked by extensive and gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, especially in the decade directly following World War II... The fact that 
Josip Broz Tito was the leader of the former state entails that it is precisely his 
name that to the greatest extent symbolises the former totalitarian regime. Tito’s 
symbolic significance cannot be divided such that only the significance of the ac-
tions that the opposing party attributes to his historical role and personality are 
considered. Once again naming a street after Josip Broz Tito, who is a symbol of 
the Yugoslav communist regime, can be understood as support not only for him 
38 Ibid., para. 37.
39 Ibid.
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as a historical figure or his individual actions, but also as support for the entire 
historical period of his rule and for his rule as such. Therefore, it is not impor-
tant what the municipal authority wished to achieve by introducing Tito Street or 
which objectives it pursued; it is important that the challenged Ordinance must 
objectively be understood as a form of recognition conferred on the former un-
democratic regime.40
The Slovenian case shows that if multiple meaning is at stake, it does not 
necessarily yield impossibility for banning a symbol in question just because this 
symbol can be linked with something positive – the fact that Tito was a leader of 
the antifascist Partisan movement. Rather, the Court held that terror and all other 
serious injuries of human rights committed under Tito’s rule after the war discre-
dited all the positive meanings of his leadership, and cannot be disregarded in that 
sense. 
While the foundational postulates of the Croatian Dialogue Document are ve-
hement in condemning the communist violations of human rights, the Council did 
not draw any conclusion similar to the Slovenian case. It decided to support the ini-
tial terminology of ambiguous versus unambiguous insignia. So, what are the ele-
ments that led to such inconsistent and unconvincing Council’s recommendations? 
First, even though the communist crimes were committed under the red star symbol, 
because the Partisan movement was fighting against fascism under that symbol, the 
Council did not suggest a blanket ban following the multiple meanings argument 
in the Vajnai case. As we can see from the Slovenian case, the Council could adopt 
a more decisive view and ban those symbolic expressions of the antifascist legacy 
that can be linked to the communist terror and its violations of human rights. In fact, 
in one of the dissenting opinions it was argued that this imbalanced double-standard 
approach of the Council that relies on “the practice of the Western EU countries” 
disregards particular Croatian historical memories and thus enhances “the old left-
ist thesis that communism, regardless of its totalitarian shortcomings, is nonetheless 
more acceptable than fascism”.41 Additional dissenting opinions were also focused 
on the incoherencies within the Document claiming that communist symbolic ex-
pressions – the five-pointed red star, the sickle and hammer, and the salute Death 
40 Slovenian Constitutional Court case-law on The Ordinance on Determining and Changing the 
Names and Course of the Roads and Streets in the Territory of Ljubljana Municipality (Official 
Gazette RS, No. 44/09), Article 2, see: http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/en/odlocitev/AN03530?q=u-i-
109%2F10.
41 Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Željko Tanjić, available in Croatian at: 
https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Mišljenje%20
prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Željka%20Tanjića.pdf.
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to Fascism, Freedom to the People – have to be put on an equal footing with other 
prima facie symbols of hate.42
Besides, the red star controversy in Croatia is further complicated since it is 
related to recent memories from the Homeland War. Unlike many other European 
cases, Croatia has its own peculiarities – the trauma of the Homeland War and the 
crimes committed by the Yugoslav military and Serbian paramilitary forces – that, 
on top of the communism/fascism divide, additionally triggers memory wars. Since 
the Council argued that “possible blanket prohibitions could also focus on the insig-
nia of the aggressors’ armed forces operating in certain parts of the Croatian state 
territory from 1991 to 1995” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 27), this implies legiti-
mate banning of the five-pointed red star when related to the aggressors’ insignia, 
i.e. as a symbol of the Yugoslav Army – it was on the helmets, uniforms, planes, 
vehicles, etc. This conclusion adds to the multiple meanings argument suggesting 
that the five-pointed red star is only viewed as disturbing for many people due to its 
connections to the communist terror, but also due to the fact that it has been addi-
tionally discredited by the Yugoslav Army and their crimes against humanity during 
the Homeland War. However, since the Council’s vindication of the five-pointed red 
star prevents from taking seriously any suggested blanket bans of the aggressors’ 
insignia of the same sort, the Council’s recommendations are inconsistent, and the 
Document is thus incoherent regarding the status and the use of the five-pointed red 
star as a symbol of antifascism, of communist terror, and also of the aggressors in 
the 1990s. While, according to the Council, “it would not be unacceptable to expli-
citly prohibit their public use” (ibid.: 26), the Document did not pursue to draft the 
ways in which this would be possible for ambiguous disputed insignia, since, due 
to their ambiguousness, these symbols were excluded from possible blanket bans. 
Regarding the aggressor’s insignia, aside from the Chetnik cockade that is listed as 
a prima facie symbol of hate, any other possible suggestion to add other symbols 
that can be semiotically linked to the aggressors has not be discussed at all. For ex-
ample, in a similar way the letter U has been used as graffiti from the 1990s on, the 
four C’s in Cyrillic were used as a symbol that many would link to the war trauma 
42 Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Mladen Ančić, Nataša Jovičić, Ivo Lučin, 
Ante Nazor, and Nevio Šetić, available in Croatian at: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsIma-
ges/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Mišljenja%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Mlade-
na%20Ančića%2c%20Nataše%20Jovičić%2c%20dr.%20sc.%20Ive%20Lučića%2c%20doc.%
20dr.%20sc.%20Ante%20Nazora%20i%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Nevija%20Šetića.pdf. In his 
dissenting opinion Ivan Savić adds that if Croatia decided to ban the five-pointed red star, or 
the sickle and hammer, this would be similar to the legal steps made by Lithuania and Hunga-
ry. See: Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Ivan Savić, available in Croatian at: 
https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Dopunsko%20
mišljenje%20doc.%20dr.%20sc.%20Vanja-Ivan%20Savić.pdf.
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and aggression. While the first mentioned symbol is considered a prima facie sym-
bol of hate, the other belongs to officially recognized Serbian heraldic. However, 
the trauma might be the same since these symbols generated their meanings through 
specific historical circumstances. In that context even the Cyrillic letters on the of-
ficial town panels were targeted and damaged due to the politicization of trauma.
But the most controversial issue, and as such even more confusing, is the Coun-
cil’s evaluation of the salute For the Homeland Ready. Controversy behind that sa-
lute has been propelling social divisions and leading to numerous public incidents 
where the use of this salute, either as part of the military insignia, or as a sort of 
provocation, a right-wing folklore, or resistance to the dominant political culture, has 
been confusing the public and the state officials – the courts and the police predomi-
nantly – since there are no explicit prohibitions in the Croatian legal system from 
using that salute.43 Various interpretations about the origin of the salute, or about 
its legitimacy have spurred growing social divisions, and the whole thing became a 
matter of politicization, especially in relation to the veterans of the Homeland War. 
One way of interpreting is the claim that this is an old Croatian salute, another that it 
is the Ustasha salute, and the third that it was originally the Ustasha salute but in the 
context of the Homeland War (predominantly as insignia of the HOS fighters, and/or 
a feature of M. P. Thompson’s song Bojna Čavoglave (The Čavoglave Battalion44)) 
it acquired new meaning. In the fall of 2017, a few months prior to the release of 
the Document, the Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović said in a TV inter-
view, while answering the question about the salute For the Homeland Ready, that 
it is an old Croatian salute, yet emphasizing that she is not a historian. But Croatian 
politician (as well as historian) Zlatko Hasanbegović, perceived in the public as a 
prominent political figure coming from the right-wing political spectrum, denied 
that the salute For the Homeland Ready can be legitimized that way: “I have never 
claimed that this is an old Croatian salute. It’s not. It is the Ustasha salute and this 
is why it is burdened. Except in one case only – when it is inside the coat of arms of 
the HOS under which that unit fought in the Homeland War.”45 In a basically simi-
43 For a more detailed account of the legislative and the use of the abovementioned salute, see 
again Cvijanović, 2016: 98-105.
44 The song is about the Croatian battalion defending the village Čavoglave during 1991, and 
it served for boosting the morale of Croatian soldiers and the people in general. The song was 
aired for the first time on 31 December 1991 during the Homeland War and has been perceived 
in the public either as patriotic, or controversial due to the fact that it starts with the salute For 
the Homeland Ready. 
45 For Hasanbegović, For the Homeland Ready can be prohibited if used exclusively as an in-
strument for incitement of hatred. Besides that he advocates no prohibition on any symbol. See: 
Hasanbegović predsjednici: Ne, “za dom spremni” nije stari hrvatski, nego ustaški pozdrav, in: 
Novi list, available at: http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/HASANBEGOVIC-PREDSJED-
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lar way, the Council starts with the premise that the salute in question is indeed the 
Ustasha salute originally, but toward the end of the Document the argument becomes 
more ambivalent and invokes a possible exception from treating it as the Ustasha sa-
lute when used as insignia and for commemorative purposes. That makes the Docu-
ment’s statement confusing and inconsistent with its premises. 
The Document is adamant in stating that “the insignia of fascism in all its 
manifestations” are “prima facie disputed insignia of hate [that] could be subject 
to a special regime of blanket prohibitions” and those, according to the Document, 
are: “the fascist Roman salute, the so-called Hitler salute accompanied by swastika, 
the Nazi ‘SS’ emblem, the Chetnik cockade, the Ustasha ‘U’, the Ustasha salute 
‘Za dom i poglavnika (For the homeland and its leader)’ and ‘Za dom spremni (For 
the homeland ready)’” (Dialogue Document, 2018: 23-25). But from the Council’s 
premises according to which all fascist symbols are considered unambiguous and 
thus have to be prohibited, and the salute For the Homeland Ready is claimed to 
be a prima facie fascist symbol, it is hard to get to the conclusion that possible ex-
ceptions, or concessions, can be made to the proposed blanket prohibition of the 
salute in question. But there is an explanation for that incoherence in the Docu-
ment. Namely, instead of facing us with the past the Council has to face us with the 
present: “we are faced with a particularly sensitive situation which arises from the 
direct conflict of, on the one hand, a prima facie disputed insignia of hate which 
the Constitution rejects, and on the other hand, the official tolerance of the uncon-
stitutional practice of its public use on the insignia of a particular Croatian mili-
tary unit...”, and hence “the necessity of balancing” between the two (ibid.: 26-27, 
underlined by H. C.).46 This is another controversial and confusing statement. The 
NICI-Ne-za-dom-spremni-nije-stari-hrvatski-nego-ustaski-pozdrav (retrieved 8 October 2018). 
Actually, a year before that statement, namely in September 2016, Hasanbegović had argued 
the claim that it was the Ustasha salute; https://net.hr/danas/hrvatska/hasanbegovic-postao-sam-
ikona-desnice-jer-me-napala-skupina-ideoloskih-uskogrudnika-svi-koji-me-poznaju-znaju-da-
nisam-ekstremist/ (retrieved 8 October 2018).
46 In the footnote the Document here refers to the case France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
Netherlands v. Turkey (1983) where the notion of “official tolerance” apparently appears in the 
context of tolerating torture in Turkey after the military coup and the emergency legislation. The 
European Commission was trying to figure out if Turkey tolerated violation of human rights at 
a lower level, not necessarily at a higher level due to the fact that there were political decisions 
from the top directed against these practices. We can find that depiction of “official tolerance” 
related to the Turkish case in the Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights (even 
though the Document does not mention any source, not even citing properly when necessary) 
that says: “though acts of torture or ill-treatment are plainly illegal, they are tolerated in the sense 
that the superiors of those immediately responsible, thought cognizant of such acts, take no ac-
tion to punish them or to prevent their repetition; or that higher authority, in face of numerous 
allegations, manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their truth or falsity, 
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concept of “official tolerance” was not only used to describe the practice in the 
1990s, but also as something that yields to “given” conditions in the contemporary 
context as a foundation for continuous concessions to be made related to the regula-
tion of the disputed salute: 
Due to the failure of the competent authorities, for more than a quarter of a cen-
tury, this salute has been de facto and de lege (also) linked to the Homeland War, 
which today serves (also) as proof in social discussions that the meaning of the 
disputed salute, that originated in the Ustasha regime, became ambiguous because 
of its use in the context of the just and legitimate Homeland War (hence it should 
be singled out and subjected to the regime of ambiguous disputed insignia). This 
proposition is not acceptable because it does not take into account the fact that 
even during the Homeland War this salute was contrary to the Constitution, how-
ever there was a lack of a proper official response, thus today we are faced with 
this salute as given (ibid.: 26).47
As we can see, the Council refuses the argument that the salute can be convert-
ed from an unambiguous prima facie fascist symbol into an ambiguous symbolic 
expression, but at the same time it de facto acknowledges the ambiguous charac-
ter of that symbolic expression in its very explanation of how the symbol has been 
perceived from the 1990s. The fact that this salute can be linked to the Homeland 
War’s insignia irrespective of its Ustasha origin proves that this symbolic expres-
sion willy-nilly adopted an additional meaning. Since, regardless of its legal status, 
the salute can be related to the Homeland War, and later on with the insignia of 
veteran associations of the former HOS militia, the whole Council’s effort to push 
for the unambiguous versus ambiguous meanings as a basis for judging between 
the disputed symbols fails. The whole “exception argument” has been articulated 
or that in juridical proceedings a fair hearing of such complaints is denied” (Council of Europe, 
1983: 24-25). This concept of “official tolerance” has been linked to the use of the disputed in-
signia in Croatia from the beginning of the 1990s until now. However, this analogy is mistaken 
since, unlike torture that was unconstitutional in Turkey, the salute For the Homeland Ready or 
other similar prima facie disputed insignia of hate have not been prohibited explicitly by the 
Croatian Constitution or by any legal act. Aside from various vague statements about general 
prohibition of intolerance, discrimination, and similar offences, the Croatian legal framework 
has never been explicit in banning particular symbolic expressions (unlike the Hungarian, for 
example), hence the “official tolerance” analogy is not applicable in that sense. 
47 In his dissenting opinion Željko Tanjić articulated this exception as a “minimal satisfaction” 
that legalizes “ZDS” (an abbreviation in Croatian for the salute Za dom spremni, or For the 
Homeland Ready); it is minimal since it “emphasizes the logic of double standards and of one-
folded openings of the old wounds”. Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Željko 
Tanjić, available at: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20
veljače/Mišljenje%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Željka%20Tanjića.pdf.
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in a clumsy way. Instead of trying to prove that the de facto ambiguous symbolic 
expression should be viewed as unambiguous, the Council could accept the multi-
ple meanings view and invoke the Fáber v. Hungary case-law since it, among all, 
deals with the controversial symbolic display as well as points toward the fact that 
the salute in the Croatian case was never officially banned. The judgment in its 
concluding statements highlighted the context when deciding about the legitimacy 
of displaying a multiple meanings symbolic expression, in this case the Hungarian 
Árpád flag. It says: 
Assuming that the banner in question has multiple meanings – that is, it can be re-
garded both as a historical symbol and as a symbol reminiscent of the Arrow Cross 
regime – it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending 
expressions appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking 
and offensive expression which is protected by Article 10 and that which forfeits 
its right to tolerance in a democratic society... The Court stresses that ill feelings 
or even outrage, in the absence of intimidation, cannot represent a pressing social 
need for the purposes of Article 10 § 2, especially in view of the fact that the flag 
in question has never been outlawed.48
However, since the Council took a different argumentative route, in order to 
be consistent with its proposal and pursue the prima facie quality of the disputed 
salute as its key argument, the exception argument cannot be applied. As president 
Tuđman in the early 1990s as well as the Council in 2018 both concluded, the salute 
has been used in an illegitimate way during the Homeland War. Therefore, from the 
Council’s argument that the salute has been used illegitimately and “contrary to the 
Constitution” it does not logically and legitimately follow that “an exception when 
it comes to the public use of the salute ‘Za dom spremni (For the homeland ready)’ 
might be taken into consideration” (ibid.: 27). The Council basically proposes a pa-
radox: even though something was illegitimate from the very beginning, due to the 
passage of time and chaotic circumstances, it obtains legitimacy no matter how li-
mited.49 If this is the Ustasha salute that has been used illegitimately by certain Cro-
atian units during the Homeland War without any legal consequences, it follows 
that it should be banned as a prima facie symbol of hate according to the Document. 
In other words, if the prima facie stipulations regarding fascist symbols are taken 
seriously, than it would be contradictory to use these symbols even for commemo-
rative purposes, just as it would be in the case of any other symbols from that group 
such as the Ustasha letter U, the German SS, or the Chetnik cockade. 
48 Fáber v. Hungary, ECtHR (2012), para. 54 and para. 56.
49 It would be the same to claim that just because I decide to take someone’s apartment, I would 
be legitimately using it after a while due to the passage of time and the fact that in these circum-
stances no one was able to throw me out of it.
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Still, there were at least a couple of possible arguments that the Council could 
deploy in this situation in order to resolve the problem of the controversial salute. 
First, it could be consistent with the prima facie stipulations in the way proposed by 
the Document. That would be possible if the Council challenged the narrative that 
legitimizes the use of controversial insignia based on the premise that many were 
fighting and dying under this symbol. The Council had to make a shift in its conclu-
sions by arguing that the fact that some soldiers were killed “under this insignia” 
is of circumstantial, not predominantly of substantial quality. Namely, what really 
matters is that these volunteers were fighting for Croatia, and not what unit they 
served in, i.e. the military unit here is of secondary importance since it changes nei-
ther their role in the Homeland War nor the fact that they would likely be volunteers 
and Croatian soldiers if these insignia did not exist at all. Such argument would 
likely reduce confusions and inconsistencies and retain no exclusions in banning 
prima facie insignia of hate. 
Second, it could defend freedom of speech. Since the Council invoked Article 
10 of the European Convention that points toward the value of free speech and the 
dangers of curbing it, the Document failed to take this argument seriously, hence 
making no real efforts in defending free speech consistently. It is interesting that ba-
sically all dissenting opinions advocate refraining from further bans, especially Ja-
kir who claims that every additional prohibition would likely be counterproductive: 
... it is delusional to think that social conflicts, as part of every democratic society, 
could be minimized, or even eliminated through repressions and prohibitions, and 
also that additional prohibitions might only deepen the existing social divisions, 
and contribute to the new ones, as well as jeopardize the Constitutionally gua-
ranteed freedom of expression and investigation. By fully accepting provisions of 
Article 39 of the Constitution which prescribes that any call or encouragement to 
war or the use of violence, national, racial or religious hatred or any form of in-
tolerance, is prohibited and punishable, I cannot support a recommendation which 
can be interpreted as a commitment to the additional “explicit prohibition of pub-
lic use of all prima facie disputed symbols”... I am convinced that it is easier for 
the democratic order to endure the negative consequences of displaying totali-
tarian symbols and those apologies for totalitarian regimes from some marginal 
groups and individuals, no matter how irrational, ethically repulsive, and harmful 
they are, then additional norms that might even be used for endangering freedom 
of speech and expression.50
50 Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Aleksandar Jakir, available at: https://vla-
da.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Mišljenje%20prof.%20
dr.%20sc.%20Aleksandar%20Jakir.pdf. Ivan Savić follows a similar line of arguing in his dis-
senting opinion emphasizing that prohibitions are of little effect and they likely lead to coun-
ter effects. See: Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Ivan Savić, available at: 
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Having in mind social divisions in Croatia, Jakir’s approach advocates for the 
broadest possible free speech defense that is aligned with the constitutional frame-
work, as well as for plural and multidimensional dealings with difficult memories, 
and promoting the dialogue and conciliatory behavior along with education, not pe-
nalization and prohibition in order to reduce social fragmentation and further politi-
cization of trauma. Furthermore, due to the fact that “symbols – and their manipula-
tion – themselves can constitute a form of resistance” (Miller-Idriss, 2017: 38-39), 
banning controversial symbolic expressions means curbing the space for free pro-
test speech as well as for public defiance against the officially established political 
discourse.51 If the use of disputed symbolic expressions does not entail any real and 
present danger, the free speech argument is opposed to the blanket prohibitions of 
that sort. Finally, focusing on education and not on prohibition is fundamental in 
facing the undemocratic regimes and their symbolic representations. Namely, while 
banning a symbol might be a symbolical defeat of the controversial symbolic ex-
pression, the idea and the narrative behind that symbol do not simply disappear; 
they survive in a different symbolic form. This is because symbolic functions can 
be attained through different symbolic forms – different emblems, markings, colors, 
practices, myths, etc. – that can change from time to time, depending on various 
(historical, cultural...) circumstances: “A change of a symbolic form does not auto-
matically entail a change of symbolic function, because the same function can be 
achieved by new forms” (Cohen, 1976: 29). This is something the Document also 
failed to acknowledge. 
Epilogue: Silence after Silence, or a Policy of Organized Forgetting 
The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty once said: “my past has its space, 
its paths, its nameplaces, and its monuments” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 15). This past 
is alive and yields constitutive building blocks of our collective memories, symbols, 
and traumas. However, there is no one past to face – we have opposed versions of 
past events, opposed evaluations, hence opposed streams of memories in the pre-
sent. Croatian society is riven to the point that we live parallel histories. We are split 
into two confronting streams of the past flowing next to each other, developing pa-
rallel, adamant, and selective one-dimensional narratives. Like in parallel universes, 
https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Dopunsko%20
mišljenje%20doc.%20dr.%20sc.%20Vanja-Ivan%20Savić.pdf. Željko Tanjić in his dissenting 
opinion is not clear since he suggests prohibition of communist symbols, but at the end advo-
cates education instead of banning symbols. See: Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Docu-
ment by Željko Tanjić, available at: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20
veljača/28%20veljače/Mišljenje%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Željka%20Tanjića.pdf.
51 I am discussing this view more extensively in: Cvijanović, 2016.
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each stream has “its own past” (moments) both traumatic and glorious at the same 
time; its own monuments, songs, salutes, anniversaries and commemorations, even 
its own favorite colors; and each prefers to be silent about crimes of its own favorite 
heroes. In these parallel mnemonic universes there is a competition among the two 
streams of the past in proving which one was more horrible, more exculpable, who 
committed more crimes, whose crimes are the gravest, whose trauma is the greatest. 
Croatian memory wars results from a divided society that has been struggling with 
its difficult past since WWII, a society in which WWII is not over yet, so each side 
still counts the bones of the dead.
After decades of silencing memories of the defeated and the crimes committed 
by “the hand of justice, the hand of retribution”,52 another veil of deafening silence 
regarding the scale of the “fascist crime” is rising. This silence is noticeable in vari-
ous revisionist takes on the NDH history (including those about detainees having 
a great time there) whose purpose is to shift focus on the communist terror. How-
ever, this silence after silence is nothing else but a policy of organized forgetting.53 
When the Dialogue Document is silent about the “fascist crime” in interpreting and 
evaluating the past, but resolute about the communist crimes at the same time, this 
contributes to such policies of organized forgetting, hence discrediting its mission 
to confront equally the consequences of both undemocratic regimes. In that sense, 
the Document fails in its conciliatory attempts and allows to be seen as just another 
52 This oxymoron that merged justice and retribution is an excerpt from Josip Broz Tito’s speech 
held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 27 May 1945 and it is related to the mass executions of the de-
feated NDH captives: “As for these traitors found within our country, in every nation especially 
– it’s a thing of the past. The hand of justice, the hand of retribution of our people, has reached 
the vast majority of them.” See: http://www.novosti.rs/dodatni_sadrzaj/clanci.119.html:539789-
Ruka-osvetnica-na-delu.
53 Page uses this expression as well the term “deafening silence” as an inadequate “typical re-
sponse to the fascist past” pointing at the presence of Mussolini’s heritage in Italy, both in terms 
of architecture as well as political life (Page, 2014; 2016: 134-140). A policy of organized for-
getting as a sort of revisionist narrative has been present in Croatia from the late 1980s on, 
especially when discussing the concentration camp Jasenovac. Tuđman’s estimations reduced 
the number of victims to 30000-40000 as well as suggested that Jews were responsible for the 
administration and even for some killings (Tuđman, 1989: 316-320, in: Radonić, 2012). Al-
so, in her analysis of the parliament speeches from 1999 related to the crimes from the past, 
Radonić shows that speeches were focused on Serbian crimes without mentioning Jasenovac 
at all (Radonić, 2012: 169). This pattern reappears in the media through the narratives of Cro-
atian victimhood on the one hand, as well as in a form of relativization of the fascists’ crimes 
via various book presentations or revisionist documentaries such as Jakov Sedlar’s Jasenovac – 
The Truth (2016), on the other hand. Finally, there are permanent political tensions regarding the 
weight that has to be given either to the Bleiburg commemoration or the one in Jasenovac (for 
more on these tensions, especially concerning Bleiburg and other sites of communist Partisans’ 
atrocities, see: Pavlaković et al., 2018). 
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ideological perspective. On top of that, the Document is, as I have shown earlier, 
confusing, inconsistent and self-defeating in its recommendations regarding dis-
puted insignia of hate, more particularly in its evaluations of the five-pointed red 
star controversy and the salute For the Homeland Ready. All its recommendations 
cannot be applied coherently since the Document does not take its own principles 
seriously when discussing these controversial symbolic expressions, but is rather 
shopping around from the cases, examples, and exceptions arbitrarily. 
In order for the Document to be consistent with its logic of arguing, it should 
either be vehement in penalizing all symbolic expressions that provoke “uneasi-
ness” or can be in any way linked to traumas of the past regimes, totalitarian terrors, 
and other shameful things that tainted particular symbolic expressions, or it should 
adopt a view on freedom of speech as it is outlined in Article 10 of the Convention, 
if not even allow for all symbols to be displayed equally no matter whose feelings 
might be disturbed. My own view is that removing/banning symbolic expressions 
falls short in cooling down Croatian memory wars and healing social divisions, as 
well as in reducing extremism and intolerance. Any banned symbol or symbolic ex-
pression does not yield real possibility of removing the frameworks of ideas behind 
them. We can legally remove all symbols of hate, but they still might be residing in 
our minds. Furthermore, imposing legal frameworks on possible interpretations of 
various symbolic expressions, or over conflicting memories (as it was the case with 
the Parliament’s Declaration on the Homeland War) euthanizes and depoliticizes 
the public sphere, and as such restricts individual freedom of expression beyond the 
state-sanctioned boundaries. Confronting is not silencing, nor forgetting, but dis-
crediting and educating about socially dividing narratives and symbolic expressions 
that keep us locked in the past.
REFERENCES
Alejandro, Roberto. 2011. Nietzsche and the Drama of Historiobiography. University of 
Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame.
Belavusau, Uladzislau. 2013. Freedom of Speech: Importing European and US Constitu-
tional Models in Transitional Democracies. Routledge. London/New York. 
Belavusau, Uladzislau & Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Aleksandra (eds.). 2017. Law and Me-
mory: Towards Legal Governance of History. Cambridge University Press. Cam-
bridge, UK.
Berger, Arthur Asa. 2006. 50 Ways to Understand Communication. Rowman & Little-
field Publishers, Inc. Lanham/Boulder/New York/Toronto/Oxford. 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 109-146
144
Berger, Arthur Asa. 2010. The Objects of Affection: Semiotics and Consumer Culture. 
Palgrave Macmillan. New York.
Bernal, Angelica M. 2017. Beyond Origins: Rethinking Founding in a Time of Constitu-
tional Democracy. Oxford University Press. New York.
Bernhard, Michael & Kubik, Jan (eds.). 2014. Twenty Years After Communism: The Poli-
tics of Memory and Commemoration. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
Cipek, Tihomir. 2017. The Spectre of Communism is Haunting Croatia. The Croatian 
Right’s Image of the Enemy, Croatian Political Science Review, (54) 1-2: 150-169.
Cohen, Abner. 1976. Two-Dimensional Man: An essay on the anthropology of power 
and symbolism in complex society. University of California Press. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles.
Council of Europe, 1983. Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights. Klu-
wer Academic Publishers. Dodrecht/Boston/Lancaster.
Cvijanović, Hrvoje. 2016. Govor kao verbalni i simbolički prostor slobode i političkog: 
američki poučak i govor mržnje u EU i Hrvatskoj, in: Kulenović, E. (ed.): Govor 
mržnje u Hrvatskoj. Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Zagreb: 61-
119.
Đurašković, Stevo. 2016a. The Politics of History in Croatia and Slovakia in the 1990s. 
Srednja Europa. Zagreb.
Đurašković, Stevo. 2016b. National identity-building and the “Ustaša-nostalgia”, Cro-
atia: the past that will not pass, Nationalities Papers, 44: 1-16.
Gigliotti, Simone (ed.). 2017. The Memorialization of Genocide. Routledge. London.
Heinze, Eric. 2017. Epilogue: Beyond ‘Memory Laws’: Towards a General Theory of 
Law and Historical Discourse, in: Belavusau, Uladzislau & Gliszczyńska-Grabias, 
Aleksandra (eds.): Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of History. Cam-
bridge University Press. Cambridge, UK: 413-433. 
Kasapović, Mirjana. 2018. Genocid u NDH: Umanjivanje, banaliziranje i poricanje 
zločina, Croatian Political Science Review, (55) 1: 7-33.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2011. Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in 
Counterdisciplinarity, International Relations, (26) 1: 3-34.
Malcolm, Noel (ed.). 1994. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. 
6: The Correspondence, Vol. 1: 1622-1659. The Clarendon Press. Oxford, UK.
Margalit, Avishai. 2002. The Ethics of Memory. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 
MA.
Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich. 1978. Manifesto of the Communist Party, in: Tucker, 
Robert (ed.): The Marx-Engels Reader. W.W. Norton & Company. New York & 
London: 469-500.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. Signs. Northwestern University Press. Evanston, IL.
Cvijanović, H., On Memory Politics and Memory Wars: A Critical Analysis...
145
Milekic, Sven. 2017. Why Croatia’s President Tudjman Imitated General Franco. Balkan 
Transitional Justice, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/why-croatia-s-presi-
dent-tudjman-imitated-general-franco-10-12-2017 (retrieved 13 May 2018).
Miller-Idriss, Cynthia. 2017. The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and 
Far Right Youth Culture in Germany. Princeton University Press. Princeton & Ox-
ford.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1994. On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge, UK.
Olick, Jeffrey. 1999. Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, Sociological Theory, (17) 
3: 333-348.
Page, Max. 2014. The Roman architecture of Mussolini, still standing. Boston Globe, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/07/12/the-roman-architecture-musso-
lini-still-standing/csZ70EN2fTnUUNqX0kRM9K/story.html (retrieved 8 August 
2018).
Page, Max. 2016. Why Preservation Matters. Yale University Press. New Haven.
Pauković, Davor. 2012. The Role of History in Legitimizing Politics in Transition in 
Croatia, in: Pauković, Davor et al. (eds.): Confronting the Past: European Experi-
ences. Political Science Research Centre. Zagreb: 183-219.
Pavlaković, Vjeran et al. 2018. The Controversial Commemoration: Transnational Ap-
proaches to Remembering Bleiburg, Croatian Political Science Review, (55) 2: 
7-32.
Preston, Paul. 1995. The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in 20th-century 
Spain. Routledge. London and New York.
Radonić, Ljiljana. 2012. Croatia’s Transformation Process from Historical Revisionism 
to European Standards, in: Pauković, Davor et al. (eds.): Confronting the Past: Eu-
ropean Experiences. Political Science Research Centre. Zagreb.
Stockey, Gareth. 2013. Valley of the Fallen: the (n)ever changing face of General Fran-
co’s monument. Critical, Cultural and Communications Press. Nottingham.
Tokić, Mate Nikola. 2018. Avengers of Bleiburg: Émigré Politics, Discourses of Victim-
hood and Radical Separatism during the Cold War, Croatian Political Science Re-
view, (55) 2: 71-88.
Veselinović, Velimir. 2016. Franjo Tuđman i pravaši, Croatian Political Science Review, 
(53) 1: 71-102.
Documents
Dialogue Document: Postulates and Recommendations on Specific Normative Regula-
tion of Symbols, Emblems and other Insignia of Totalitarian Regimes and Move-
ments, the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of Undemocratic Regimes, 
February 28th 2018 (Zagreb), available at: https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 109-146
146
Vijesti/2018/05%20svibanj/5%20svibnja//DOKUMENT%20DIJALOGA%20
ENG.pdf (retrieved 4 May 2018).
Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Željko Tanjić, available at: htt-
ps://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/
Mišljenje%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Željka%20Tanjića.pdf (retrieved 9 October 
2018).
Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Mladen Ančić, Nataša Jovičić, Ivo 




dr.%20sc.%20Nevija%20Šetića.pdf (retrieved 9 October 2018).
Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Ivan Savić, available at: https://vlada.
gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/Dopunsko%20
mišljenje%20doc.%20dr.%20sc.%20Vanja-Ivan%20Savić.pdf (retrieved 9 October 
2018).
Dissenting opinion on the Dialogue Document by Aleksandar Jakir, available at: https://
vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/Vijesti/2018/02%20veljača/28%20veljače/
Mišljenje%20prof.%20dr.%20sc.%20Aleksandar%20Jakir.pdf (retrieved 9 Octo-
ber 2018).
Hasanbegović predsjednici: Ne, “za dom spremni” nije stari hrvatski, nego ustaški 
pozdrav, in: Novi list, available at: http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/
HASANBEGOVIC-PREDSJEDNICI-Ne-za-dom-spremni-nije-stari-hrvatski-ne-
go-ustaski-pozdrav (retrieved 18 October 2018).
Case-law
Vajnai v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2008).
Fáber v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (2012).
Slovenian Constitutional Court case-law on The Ordinance on Determining and Chan-
ging the Names and Course of the Roads and Streets in the Territory of Ljubljana 
Municipality (Official Gazette RS, No. 44/09), Article 2, see: http://odlocitve.us-rs.
si/en/odlocitev/AN03530?q=u-i-109%2F10
Mailing Address: Hrvoje Cvijanović, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of 
Zagreb, Lepušićeva 6, 10000 Zagreb. E-mail: hrvoje.cvijanovic@fpzg.hr
Cvijanović, H., On Memory Politics and Memory Wars: A Critical Analysis...
